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The Strike Across the Seas
On 1 August 1925, British seamen, on shore or on the high
seas, had their monthly Mages cut -from £10 to £9, on the initia-
tive of Havelock Wilson, General President of the National
Sailors and Firemen's Union of Great Britain and Ireland (NSFU).
Some who were about to embark in British ports, stayed ashore,
although the strike never prospered in the UK; but those at sea,
who landed in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, walked
off their ships, and stayed out for periods up to three months.
A strike in the merchant marine in 1925 was a serious matter
for the economies of Britain and the Dominions. Air travel was
still exceptional: exporters of raw materials, agricultural
produce, manufactured goods, mail and travellers, relied on
regular sailings. Any prolonged delay would lead to losses by
farmers, traders and manufacturers, but the intensity of the
class struggle in the mid-twenties had reached a point where
governments, and sections of the ruling class in Europe, were
prepared to gamble with local economies in order to smash the
working class movement.
The seamen looked like soft targets in Britain, at a time when
miners, railwaymen and others threatened to defy the government
over wage cuts. There was large scale unemployment in the merch-
ant marine, and scabs were readily available in Britain. Furthei—
more, the NSFU negotiating directly with the ship owners through
the National Maritime Board (NMB), made the offer of a wage cut,
at a time when the trade union movement was fighting wage cuts in
the coal and other industries. The seamen were split, occupation-
ally, regionally, and politically: many belonging to the splinter
Amalgamated Marine Workers Union (AMWU), with strongholds in
Glasgow and Southampton, although some carried membership cards
of the NSFU, required for securing a berth in most British ships.
Havelock Wilson relied on the fact that seamen in Britain
could not sustain a strike, and in this he was correct. The
seamen's action against wage cuts faltered, and seemed to
collapse at an early stage. The NSFU condemned those who stayed
out, and the AMWU leaders repudiated the strike throughout
2August. It was left to the National Minority Movement <NMM),» to
provide the personnel -for the unofficial strike committee in
London, consisting mainly of members of the NSFU, and including
George Hardy, leader of the transport section of the NMM.3 The
use of scabs ensured the sailing of mast ships, albeit with some
delays. Furthermore, the tugboatmen worked normally, and the
AMWU, to whom they belonged, refused to call them out throughout
the seven weeks of the strike in Britain, on the grounds that
they were governed by a separate agreement.3
The events in Britain will be presented elsewhere,4 and will
discuss the role of Havelock Wilson, Liberal M.P., anti-social-
ist, Empire patriot, and leading supporter of the Spencer union
which broke away from the National Union of Miners in 1926,° and
will show that the strike was as much against the NSFU as against
the shipowners. The role of Emmanuel Shinwell, leader of the
AMWU, irresolute and divisive through the strike, also needs
appraisal.* What has also become apparent from our researches, is
that the factor that altered the course of the strike, and which
no one had forseen, was the action in overseas ports. Over and
above strike action in Britain, some 10—15,000 men walked off the
ships in the Dominions, and it was their action, together with
that of tens of thousands of men and women who supported them,
that kept the strike going for two to three months.
The first stoppage was in Australia on 21 August, where the
sailors were fortunate in obtaining the backing of the Seamen's
Union of Australia (SUA) - themselves locked in battle with the
1
 The rank and file movement started by the Communist Party
of Great Britain, and affiliated to the Red International of
Labour Unions, or Profintern.
a
 Hardy, a one time Wobbly was the only non-seaman on the
Committee. For his version see G. Hardy, Those Stormy Yearsa
Memories of the Fight for Freedom on Five Continents. Lawrence
and Wishare, 1956. Hardy was the Comintern representative in
South Africa in the mid-30s. See also R.E. Bond 'The Unofficial
Strike of British Seamen', International Press Correspondence.
(Inprecor), Vol.5, No.55, 1V2S, pp.164-b.
3
 This accusation, contained in reports by members of the
NMM, is partisan, and awaits confirmation.
* A book is being written on the strike together with
Lorraine Vivian.
" J. Havelock Wilson, The Red Hand Exploiting the Trade
Union Movement: The Communist uttensive Hgainst tne British
Einoire" iiOtn uentury Press, IVi!/.
* In the many versions of his autobiography, Shinwell
studiously avoids any mention of the strike. A letter to him,
requesting an interview, received no answer.
3government over local strike action.7 There were -few sailors
available as scabs in Australia, and the strike continued, with
the aid of the SUA, for almost three months. Partly inspired by
news o-f the action in Australia, and also because of their own
anger at receiving reduced wages, there were strikes in other
countries within the week.
The Strike in Durban
On 24 August the Australian crew of the Apolda. a steamer
chartered by the South African government demanded Australian
wages and conditions, and the SUA demanded that this be adhered
to, or all South African ships would be blacked. The event was
not connected with the strike, and there was no question of pay
being deducted,0 but this seems to have acted as a catalyst, and
two days later the crews of three ships were reported to have
come out in Durban.* The men agreed to work in port, but would
not sail unless their grievances were attended to, and there were
reports that other crews might join them.10 The strike spread to
Cape Town, and with stoppages in East London and in Lourenco
Marques, there was only restricted sea traffic between the South
African ports, or between the country and the outside world for
forty seven days.11
Economically, the strike affected South Africa badly. To
maintain a favourable balance of trade, it was estimated that the
country needed a surplus of visible exports over visible imports
of £15,000,000. The only substantial exports, besides gold and
diamonds, were food and wool, and the optimum months for the
latter were from August to October. In 1925 plentiful rain, and
control of pests and blight, had led to bumper crops after years
of depression, and delays in shipping would severely affect the
7
 The strike in Britain is discussed briefly in Basil
liogridge, 'Militancy and Intel—Union Rivalries in British
Shipping, 1911-1929', International Review of Social History.
Vol.6, No.3, 1961. There are short accounts of events in the
antipodes, and the only account, in secondary sources, of events
in South Africa, is in the biography of Col. Creswell by his
widow.
" Natal Advertiser. 28 August 1925.
' There was a small South African Sailor's and Firemen's
Union at Cape Town, but the Natal Advertiser. 28 August 1925,
stated that it was not involved in the call for a strike.
1 0
 Star. 24, 26 August 1925. Argus (Melbourne), 28 August.
11
 There appears to have been only one boat affected in
Lourenco Marques, and one in East London. The newspapers
claimed that the strike lasted for 47 days, but in effect many
ships were held up for 60 days or more.
4country and local -farming communities.1=! Maize and oranges due
for export were stored in the ports or the countryside: the
oranges in danger o-f rotting, and the maize attracting rats, with
the added danger o-f plague.13 Imported food, including flour, was
in short supply, and more general imports — some ordered for the
Christmas season — were threatened.1*
Besides consumer goods, the mail to Britain was badly affect-
ed, and business communications with the country's main trading
partner slowed down: the cable, as was pointed out early in the
strike, could not replace the postal service and was heavily
overloaded.10 Machinery needed by the mines was either held up in
Europe, or lay in the ships' holds, in danger of rusting.1* Gold
was not exported; bunker coal for the ships was unsold; and
ostrich feathers lay neglected in storage, while the European
market for this foppery collapsed.
In the first days of the strike business interests sought a
means to man the ships, and one newspaper suggested that:
We must protect ourselves if we can. Me must span in the
natives [who]... would be glad of the work. They would do it
quite efficiently at reasonable rates... The stoking and
stewarding of the steamers is a simple task and the natives
could easily be trained to do it.17
The newspaper claimed it 'should be sorry to carry out such a
change', but it would be necessary to stop the country's trade
being brought to a standstill. The writer also thought that
General Hertzog might have trouble with his labour colleagues in
the Nationalist-Labour pact government, but would have to face
the alternatives of losing the season's citrus crop, or offending
the socialists.1" Initially, the Nationalist Party opposed the
strike and joined the NSFU in calling on the seamen to return to
work, although keen republicans as they were, they could not have
responded kindly to Havelock Wilson's claim that the strike was a
plot by men who wished to break up the British Empire. All
negotiating was left to Colonel Creswell, the leader of the South
1 2
 Times. <London), 6 November 1925.
1 3
 Evening News. (Glasgow), 1 September 1925.
1
* Daily Dispatch. 10 September 1925.
1 H
 Natal Advertiser. 26 August 1925.
x
* Star. 3 September 1925.
Eastern Province Herald, quoted in Natal Witness. 29
August
"• Ibid.
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African Labour Party (SALP). This threatened to tear the party
apart: Creswell the Minister of Labour, wanted to end the strike,
and offered to mediate between shipowners and seamen, while
Walter Madeley and Morris Kentridge, expressed support, at least
initially, for the seamen.
The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), and white trade
unionists were also drawn into the conflict. CPSA involvement,
like so many of the events of the strike, seems to have been
accidental. Soloman Biurski, a party member read of the strike in
the local press, and he hurried to the docks with offers of
financial assistance, and a campaign to back the striker's
demands, which were gladly taken up. The trade unions also
contributed substantially to strike funds, and this was of great
assistance to the men who had no independent source of funds. But
this was to be used by union officials in Cape Town, to lever the
seamen away from their communist supporters.
However, that is running ahead of the story, which in South
Africa starts in Durban, with the agitation that followed the
court case of two seamen on 28 August, for refusing to obey the
lawful commands of the master. The men were sentenced to fourteen
days imprisonment with hard labour suspended for two weeks,
subject to their immediate return to duties,1*
There was further unrest amongst the strikers when Reuters
reported on 1 September that the Union Castle Line was recruiting
700 lascars in Bombay to replace existing crews. The use of
lascars was not a new departure by the shipping companies, as
many vessels calling at South African ports were worked by such
crews. However, the public was scandalised to hear that lascars
would be used as scabs against white crews, and it was reported
that the shipping companies lost the public support they had
previously enjoyed. One observer was reported as saying that
lascar crews would eventually take over all cargo vessals, 'but
to introduce strike breaking crews at this present"time is a
different matter'.30
At this juncture two men, H.H. Kemp atnd Dan Simons, with a
history of involvement in earlier struggles, entered the fray in
Durban. Kemp, one time assistant town clerk, and member of the
municipal union, had been victimised in January 1920. This
brought the workers out for three days, and all municipal
services came to a standstill. A board of control (or 'Soviet')
Natal Mercury. 28 August 1925.
Natal Advertiser. 1 September 1925.
was installed in the town hall, and within the day, he was
reinstated and a permanent conciliation board of councillors and
employees established.21 Kemp was in the Labour Party <SALP)
until May 1924, but was expelled -for opposing the party nominee
in the general election. He was defeated at the polls, and then
called for the formation of a new party which would exclude all
Asiatics from South Africa.M He now cabled the government to
stop the recruitment of lascars, saying:
Durban feels virtually as one man on this subject (sic).
Ugly situation will arise. Would recall to your memory
events of 1897 at the Point. Remember on this occasion there
will be no Harry Escombe to thwart public will...33
Daily meetings were called at the Town Gardens to put the
sailor's case to the public, and this forum Mas dominated by
Kemp, and Dan Simons, who was described in the press as a para-
lysed ex—miner. Simons had been a Labour Party town councillor in
Benoni in 1911. He worked at the New Kleinfontein mine, and in
mid-1913 was on the strike committee before this incident grew
into the general strike of July 1913. With his ardour undimin—
ished he supported the railwaymen's strike in January 1924 and
was detained when martial law was declared." Sometime there-
after he was crippled, and he retired to Durban where he sold
tobacco and cigarettes from his wheel chair near the Gardens.M
There was a large crowd at the first meeting and Simons 'neglec-
ted his business', and organised a collection for the six men due
to appear in court the next day. Thereafter, he presided at all
meetings in the Gardens, and was appointed President of the
Durban strike committee. Kemp was the main speaker at the second
meeting and the crowd that gathered was stated to be 15,000
strong. He reminded his audience that he stood for the expulsion
3 1
 J.H. and R.E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa.
1850—1950. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1V6V.
a a
 Umteteli wa Bantu. 10 May 1925-
3 3
 Councillor Kemp, Durban, to the Prime Minister, Pretoria,
quoted in Natal Advertiser. 2 September 1925. (The Hon. Harry
Escombe had intervened to prevent disorder at the Point in 1897,
following public outcries against the continued importation of
indentured Indians into South Africa).
'"•'•'This profile of Simons has been pieced together from
press reports, in which his name was accidentally found, in
researches on the strikes of 1913-14. See Rand Daily Mail. 29 May
1913-3 June 1913; and Transvaal Leader. 18, 31 January 1914,
(that of 18 Jan. reports his intervention at a meeting in Benoni
where~,he stopped a vigilance Committee being formed, and success-
fullyVmoved a counter motion supporting the railwaymen's strike).
2 H
 Natal Mercury. 2, 3 September 1925. News reports in 1925
made no mention ot either Kemp's or Simon's past activities, and
fragments of their stories came to light during research on
earlier industrial actions..
7o-f all Asiatics from South Africa, and said that if lascars came,
he would lead the citizens of Durban in throwing them into the
Indian Ocean.
Other speakers brought messages of solidarity from the Labour
Party, and the white trade unions, but Kemp dominated the gather-
ing, and rallied the widest support. He spoke again the next day
at a meeting of (white) railwaymen, and when he mentioned the
lascars, and his many previous anti-Asiatic campaigns, he was
greeted by cries of 'Bravo Kemp' and "Up Boys and at 'e«'.z6
Kemp's call for Indian repatriation was not unique or origin-
al, and was the policy of all governments in South Africa (and
also of the SALP). Measures to this end were placed before the
Natal Provincial Council and Parliament in 1923-5. In 1924
Indians in Natal towns lost the municipal franchise, and their
right to buy or lease land. A Class Areas Bill was introduced by
Patrick Duncan in Parliament for their compulsory trading and
residential segregation, but fell away in June with the defeat of
the Smuts government. Dr Maian, Minister of the Interior in the
pact government reintroduced the measure as the Areas Reservation
Bill in mid—1925, with even more stringent clauses to restrict
Indian rights. Although the Bill was shelved, it remained a
permanent threat to Indian rights in South Africa.ay
Mass meetings of Indians were held in Durban against the
Reservation Bill, and there were calls for a Round Table Confer—
ence to discuss their position in. the country. During the strike
the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) expressedg 'deep regret'
over the planned use of lascars as scabs, which they likened to
the original importation of indentured labour in the sugar
estates of Natal. Both events led to anti-Indian campaigns, and
the introduction of lascars would 'intensify the activities of
the anti—Asiatics'. They urged 'responsible leaders of India' to
denounce the shipping companies.as
At a Cape Indian Defense Committee meeting speakers were more
damning. They warned lascars to stay away as this 'was purely a
white man's dispute, Cbecause] ... both sides, in their capaci-
ties as voters when on shore, were parties to the repressive
a
* Natal Mercury. 4 September 1925.
xrr
 Eric Walker, A History of South Africa. Longmans, Green.
1947, p.610. ' U ' '
="• Natal Mercury. 2 September 1925; Times of India. 2, 3
September 1925.
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legislation passed under the British Crown against their Indian
fellow-citizens'. ="
As reports came in that lascars were being recruited, and were
on their way, the Indian organisations grew ever more apprehen-
sive. Amod Bhayat, President of the Natal Indian Congress sent
cables to 'prominent persons' in India:
Community here disapproves such action as unfair to strik-
ers, and -further complicates present Indian problem. We
implore you keep Indians out of this strike so preserve
Indian honour. Suggest recall any lascars already left.30
Abdul Karim of the Natal Indian Association cabled the Viceroy of
India and Pandit Motilal Nehru on similar lines, saying that,
Arrival lascars South Africa this juncture when all minds
agitated new Asiatic Bill disastrous Indian interests.
Local Indians strongly resent Indian seamen exploited as
strike breakers totally condemn action shipowners rushing to
India unmindful serious issues involved. Pray recall
lascars.31
The Times of India, reflecting local concern, condemned the
recruitment of scabs, stating that they could be hurt, and warned
of unpleasant consequences for the whole Indian community in
South Africa.33 The General Secretary of the Indian Seamen's
Union also pointed to the rejection of lascars sent as scabs
during the shipping strike in China, and he asked officials of
the All India TUC to stop any lascars signing up for South
Africa.33
Whether lascars were ever recruited remains a mystery. The
Times of India, carried conflicting reports: that inquiries had
been made about the availability of Indian crews from local
agents of shipping companies; that such crews could be supplied;
and then silence.3"* If attempts were made to raise the 640 scabs
the Union Castle line was said to have requested, they were never
sent. But the report did not stop intense agitation throughout
="» Natal Mercury. 2 September 1925.
3 0
 Natal Mercury. 3 September 1925.
3 X
 Natal Advertiser. 3 September 1925; Times of India. 4
SeptemberIv25(which fleshed out the message^ inserting words
that had been excluded to cut the cost of cabling).
3 3
 Tfines of India. Editorial, 3 September 1925.
?3w Times of India. 5 September 1925.
3
'* Reports appeared in Times of India between 1—5 September.
Similar reports appeared in the Mouth African, British and
Australian presses - some coming via Reuters, others without
reference to any news agency.
South Africa. The press carried copious reports (and rumours) on
the matter and Die Burger Mas quoted as saying that 'Public
opinion Mill not permit it, and He -fear it will merely give rise
to undesirable emotional excitement and even to worse things'.30
Prime Minister Hertzqg received hundreds of telegrams -from all
over the country protesting against the use of lascars as scabs,
and the Cabinet response Has that:
Under the Ian, lascars, being Asiatics, are prohibited
immigrants, and the Master of the ship bringing such persons
to a port of the Union is ordered to retain such persons on
his ship and to remove them from the Union, failing which he
is subject to heavy penalties. Landing for temporary
purposes or trans-shipment is not permitted without the
consent of the Immigration authorities. The Government has
received no information from the shipowners, who are well
aware of the law if any such step is taken as that indicated
by Reuter's telegram.3*
The issue was dead, and when it was reported on 17 September,
that lascars who were on ships involved in the strike in Durban,
were fraternising with their white colleagues there was no
noticeable reaction.
Seventeen British vessels were in Durban harbour in early
September, and 1,235 men were ashore (including 200 engineers,
officers and others who were not involved in the dispute). The
men left the ships, after attempts to take the Port Curnow three
miles out to sea, where men were ordered to work, or face mutiny
charges.37 On 18 September, Creswell visited Durban to meet
shipowners and men and wired Hertzog that the men would not stay
on the ships even though they saidc
Me know that we are liable as prohibited immigrants ashore
to be run in. We are quite prepared for you Cto] put us in
gaol or in detention camp under strict guard but we will not
return Cto] ship with risk be taken seas as Port Curnow was.
If owners will guarantee us against this will return at
once.3™
The guarantees could not be given, and further discussions
proved futile. Creswell urged that the government remain neutral
in the dispute, particularly as 'unanimous denunciation that
3 0
 Star. 2 September 1923.
3
* Letter from General Hertzog to the Mayor of Durban,
reported in Natal Mercury. 3 September 192S; Times of India.
4 September 1925.
3 7 The first such attempts to take a ship out with the crew
held below board was in Cape Town (see below). See Natal Mercury.
10 September 1925; Star, 19 September; Daily Record and Mail-
(Glasgow), 8 September 1925.
3 a
 Telegram. 18 September 1925, Central Archives, Pretoria:
Justice File, 409:4/385/25 part 2.
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tof?] Union by seamen as not efficient agent and uncontrolled by
them'. He thought that the government should charter ships to
relieve the situation.3"* The men were billeted in the houses of
sympathisers, occupied corners in work sheds, or camped in open
spaces. They purchased food with funds collected by trade unions
(including the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union — ICU),
and Labour or Communist groups throughout South Africa.*0
The strikers faced many setbacks. Men were being sent to
prison, or faced charges arising from the strike. Furthermore,
some ships sailed with skeleton crews, or with locally recruited
scabs, and the seamen also watched helplessly when British
vessels manned by lascars, or non-British ships, loaded produce
and sailed for Europe."11 Nonetheless the men remained firm, and
countered press reports that they had surrendered. On 24 Septem-
ber the Durban Strike Committee issued their ninth strike
bulletin, in which they claimed that:
These statements are deliberate lies. No reductions have
been accepted and the strike committee has not, and does not
intend to put these so—called proposals in front of the men.
The whole thing is a dirty attempt to sow the seeds of panic
in the ranks of the strikers...Immediate steps have now been
taken to prevent any trickery of this sort being flung
against us in the future... Ship committees have been set up
on ... vessels composed of delegates of the seamen and
firemen in order to keep contact between the men on board
the ships in harbour and the strike committee ashore.
Henceforth every striker will know in detail how things
stand... Meanwhile, the solidarity of the position is sill
as strong as ever with every man—jack standing fast...*=
The men faced many tests in the coming days, with an increas-
ing number of unemployed trying to board the ships. Pickets were
deployed in the neighbourhood of companies known to be recruiting
crews, and were also posted at railway stations as far inland as
Pietermaritzburg, to intercept men who were being brought down by
the shippers. The press, (and strike bulletins), reported
increasing violence, as men were confronted and stopped from
reaching the ships. Meanwhile, the seamen approached some
=" Ibid.
*° Star. 19 September 1925, and 24 September in which the
Johannesburg branch of the ICU was reported as forwarding
£3.5s.6d. to the strikers, with a pledge to continue.
•** Daily Record and Mail. 8 September 1925.
•*
=
 "Strike Bulletin No.9', reprinted in Natal Advertiser. 25
September 1925. The Bulletin also reported on the number of
strikers in prison, and stated that only one of the ships on
strike had left South Africa for Britain, and that some ships
with.-blackleg crews had left "home ports , but very few had gone
back,}, (Our thanks to the Durban Municipal Library, and to Rob
Lambert for reprints from the Advertiser)•
11
captains, with intimations that they would welcome talks to end
the deadlock.*3
Action in Cape Town
For the first week only the white unions and the SALP
supported the seamen. In Durban they provided money and comforts
for the crews, and on 30 August, the Transvaal Labour Party
Conference, backed the seamen's strike, and rejected the govern-
ment's support for the shipping companies. Creswell opposed the
resolution saying that the seamen were duty bound to honour the
agreement entered into by their union.** But there was another
reason: the 'pact' government represented both farmers and white
workers, and members of the SALP, seemed more concerned with
placating farmers than advancing the cause of labour.
The Cape Federation of Trades, to which most (white) trade
unions were affiliated, spoke for the seamen until A.Z. Barman,
the acting secretary, announced: firstly, that the Federation was
approaching the Fruit Exchange (the government'* co-operative
marketing board) to arrange for the sailing of the Roman Star
with a cargo of oranges,*0 and secondly, that the men were
prepared to accept the restoration of the status quo pending the
reopening of the whole question through conciliation or arbitrat-
ion in Britain; and the postponement of the new rates pending
such negotiations.**
The seamen, who had not been consulted, repudiated Berman and
the Federation,*7 and it was at this stage that Solomon Biurski,
of the CPSA met the men, and they elected a strike committee,
with Biurski as their secretary.*" The CPSA offices in Long
Street became strike headquarters, and the party called daily
Natal Advertiser. 29 September 1925. reprinted the latest
b l e t i n , and also carried reports of picket activities.strike ulletin
** Evening Citizen. (Glasgow), 31 August 1925; Friend. 31
*™ Cape Arous. 2 September 1925. Berman, one-tine editor of
the Bolshevik.was a member of the SALP.
** Dai 1y Record and Mai 1. 4 September 1925.
*
y
 Star. 4 September 1925.
*• S. Biurski, Fleeting Memories. Typescript, n.d. I first
learnt of the strike in this document, shown me by William
Beinart, and together with Beinart asked Biurski in 1984, for
more details. Newspaper reports confirm much of Biurski's
account, but where there are discrepencies I have used reports
that appeared at the time.
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street meetings to put the seamen's case to the public, collect
money, arrange billeting, and so on.*'
Biurski claims that he led the strike action in Cape Town, and
together with Joe Pick and S.A. Rochlin, both members of the
CPSA, this seems to have been the case -for at least three weeks.
On 22 September, S.P. Bunting, the communist leader, declared
that at the Cape the strike
was being very largely and materially assisted, i-f not
actually conducted, by the Communists, who were always
associated with any trouble in which the workers' interests
were at stake. The Communists took credit -for that, and
their object was to secure the unconditional surrender of
the shipowners, which was the only possible condition of
settlement.... The men were fighting for 8d. per day, but as
Communists we are supporting them for something more.00
The committee's first concern was the fifteen million oranges
loaded in the specially refrigerated hold of the Roman Star. *
Herman and other leaders of the Cape Labour Party had appealed to
the crew not to strike, because the ship had been chartered by
the Fruit Exchange,"1 and many fruit farmers would be ruined if
the boat did not sail.552 It was this that prompted Creswell to
mediate between shippers and seamen,93 and Madeley and Kentridge
said they would go to Cape Town because of their concern about
agricultural cargoes, if they felt that their presence (as
supporters of the strike at the SALP conference) would help."1*
On 4 September, Biurski announced that the seamen did not wish
to be discourteous to the government, and would therefore meet
Creswell, but that the dispute could only be settled in London.30
In private discussions the Minister appealed to the strike
committee to let the ship sail 'as a gesture to the first labour
government (sic) in South Africa'. The men agreed, provided that
it was announced in every port that the committee had given its
•" South African Department of Justice files, 3/1064/18,
Report to Secretary for Justice, 1 February 1926, microfilm held
at School of Oriental and African Studies, Reel 5. See also
statement by a fireman in Cape Argus. 5 September 1925: 'We are
not Communists - but they are the only ones collecting money for
us in order to send cables and wires, and they offered us their
hall to meet in'.
=° Cape Araus. 23 September 1925.
= 1
 Evening News. 1 September 1925.
=
3
 Star. 2 September 1925.
=
3
 Ibid.
="* Star. 3 September 1925.
== Cape Argus. 4 September 1925.
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permission, and also that the ship return to Cape Town with the
same crew if the strike was still on. But Creswell had no power
to agree to the terms, and when a ballot showed that the men
opposed the sailing, this agreement fell through.0*
The Roman Star did sail, but only after the crew was offered
an extra £6 for the next year, much to the annoyance of the
shipowner's federation.07 The journey was not without its drams:
there was an explosion in the engine room when a detonator was
shovelled into the ship's furnace, and three crew members were
injured"". Sabotage was suspected, and Blurski suggested retro-
spectively that it might have been the work of a fireman who
burst into a strike committee meeting, and said he was volunteer—
ing for the crew, but they were not to think badly of him.0*
However, nothing Was discovered.
Other consignments of oranges did not sail, and there were
reports that oranges worth £35,000 would have to be dumped in
Table Bay,*° and it was said that in Marico alone, citrus growers
and packers lost over £3O,OOO.*» Other produce was also held up,
and maize got away mainly on foreign ships, while dairy farmers
were forced to keep back butter and eggs, and faced considerable
losses.*"
Creswell's attempts to mediate failed. He could have net some
of the seamen's demands, such as the release of all strikers from
gaol, and a government guarantee not to tow ships to the outer
anchorage. However, other demands were not within his powers. The
seamen wanted the wage cut restored, and the abolition of the
Maritime Board (a statutory body on which the shipowners and the
NSFU were jointly represented, and at which wages were agreed).
They also demanded that Havelock Wilson be denied any voice in
the affairs of the British mercantile marine.*3
•* S. Biurski, Fleeting Memoirs, p.36; Daily Dispatch. 9
September 1925. /'
"•" Star. 9 September 1923; Fairnlav (London), 25 September.
"" Daily Record and Mail. 9 October 1925.
"" Fleeting Memories, p.36.
*° Star. 17 September 1925.
** Star. 22 September 1925.
*
a
 Daily Record and Mail. 22 September 1925.
*= Star. 5 September 1925; Natal Mercury. 9 September. A
Department of Labour dispatch suggested postponement of the red-
uctions for six months, and that the Unions be adequately repre-
sented on the Maritime Board, or that this be investigated at a
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Support for the seamen also came -from passengers on the
Ballarat. consisting of a large number of migrants to Australia
under a joint Commonwealth—State scheme, and some Australian
seamen who were travelling home. These men and women had estab-
lished warm relations with the ships crew in the three weeks it
took to reach Cape Town.** It was the Australian seamen who were
probably 'crucial in steeling both militance among the crew, and
sympathy among the passengers'.*™
The Ballarat was in port for forty three days, being there
from the start, and remaining until the very end. Some of the
determination shown by the men can be ascribed to the support of
the passengers, but other factors soon entered into their
determination. Men of the Ballarat persuaded the men of the
Arundel Castle, to join with them against the cut in wages, and
together they constituted the 'local fortress of dissent'.**
With no sign of an end to the strike, the captains tried to
get their ships out to sea. In one incident which was to affect
all strikers, the master of the Sophocles locked his crew in the
messroom, and with the assistance of the officers got the ship
beyond the three miles limit. The seamen were then ordered down
to the boiler room, and warned that non-compliance would lead to
charges of mutiny, but they retorted that they had stated when at
anchor that they would not sail, and this negated the charge of
mutiny. Three hours later the Sophocles was back in port,*^ and
the crew called on everyone to stand firm,*™ Fears of other
capains trying the same ruse led to crews walking off the ships
in Durban and Cape Town.*' In Cape Town there were insufficient
billets, although many families helped with accommodation. Assis-
tance was sought, and the men were taken to the Wynberg military
top level British inquiry; see Daily Dispatch. 9 September 1925.
*"* My thanks to Michael Roe, of the University of Tasmania,
for a copy of his unpublished paper, 'Strike Bound in Cape Town,
1925: Responses Aboard an Australian Migrant Ship'. Life aboard
ship had been 'perhaps beyond the norms of shipboard liberation'
according to one prurient passenger, quoted by Roe.
*•» Ibid.
** Ibid.
*T Natal Mercury. 7 September 1925; Biurski, Fleeting
Memories,) p..SS. BTurski states that the crew had signaled (by
semaphore) that the officers were firing the boilers, and that he
had suggested this course of action.
*
s
 The statement is printed in Natal Mercury. 11 September
1925. :
*^ For the events in Durban, see above.
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camp, where they Mere bound by minor restrictions, and became
charges of the government. Ultimately, some 600 men Mere in the
camp, under canvas, supplied with blankets, rations and cooking
utensils.70
But ships did get away in increasing numbers as some men
drifted back to the ships, or as unemployed whites volunteered
(at £9.10s. per month),.for service. The scabs faced a barrage o-f
abuse, but they were defiant and generally impervious to the
pleas of the men on strike.7*
A Labour 'COUP', and the End of the Strika
Except for the agitation over the lascars, the strike seemed
to have been supported mainly by whites in South Africa - but
mainly as sympathisers. White workers who rallied behind the
seamen did not contemplate industrial action, and at most the
unions passed the hat around. The rumours (as early as 31 August)
that African stevedores in Durban were discussing a strike" did
not lead to any action.
One week later, James LaBuma, the General Secretary of the ICU
in Cape Town informed Clemens Kadalie, the President, that
dockers were discussing strike action if their demands for better
wages and conditions were not met. He also said that the strike
committee in London sent a cable to the crew of the Arundel
Castle, via the ICU office in Cape Town, stating that the strike
was 'solid' in London, and calling on the strikers to stay
firm.73 LaBuma continued:
I have also been approached by several representatives of
the seamen, or at least it has been suggested that we, the
ICU should take up the negotiations on behalf of the seamen;
but I pointed out the regrettable colour prejudice in this
country and the fear that it would be detrimental to them by
alienating the sympathy of the European public, which they
have strongly at present...7*
7 0
 Cape Arous. 16 September 1925.
7 1
 See e.g. the defiant response of 12O scabs employed by
the Arundel Castle, when strikers appealed to them, as reported
in Natal Mercury. 22 September 192S.
7 a
 Natal Mercury. 31 August 1923.
7 3
 Cape Argus. 7 September 192S.
7 4
 The fullest account appears in Natal Advertiser. B
September 1925. —
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Kadalie, however, offered to take over negotiations on behalf
of the seamen.'0 But he agreed with LaGuma, that after the strike
there would be a large demand for dock labour to load the ships,
and urged the implementation of the ICU demand, of 1925: that all
dockers be paid the same rate as that prevailing in Cape Town.7*
No more was heard of the negotiations, although members of the
ICU did attend rallies in support of the seamen in Cape Town.
There was no further talk of strikes in the docks.
Large numbers of seamen were charged for disobeying orders,
and only stayed out of gaol pending appeals. For this, bail was
needed and funds were not easily available. The trade unions
provided considerable sums,'"'' and in late September, R. Stuart,
Secretary of the Federation of Trades used this to "invite" the
strikers to switch their headquarters from the CPSA to his
offices, and when rejected, threatened that financial support
would be withdrawn.''™ The committee moved to the offices of the
Federation,7* but this did not end the matter: a strike bulletin
critical of the Federation appeared, and the strike money was
immediately suspended. The committee thought of breaking with the
Federation, but then sought a compromise.™0
The South African economy was in difficulties, with wool
producers facing disaster; the bank exchange rate moving against
the local currency, and gold still awaiting export. But the
shipowners and the NSFU would make no concessions.B1 There was a
ballot in Durban at the end of September, despite the disclaimer
in the strike bulletin (of 25 September), but only thirty voted
to return to work.™2 But the strike was collapsing, and on 10
October men in Durban agreed under protest to end the strike by
311 votes to 230, with the promise of no victimisations, no
prosecutions, clean discharges and the customary opportunity of
7>H
 Ibid.
*•<• Ibid.
7 7
 See e.g. Cape Argus. 17 September 1925. The Cape Town
Tramway Union voted the sum of £100 per week for four weeks; the
Typographical Union called for a voluntary levy of Is. per man
per week; the Carpenters Union was to discuss the matter.
""" Cape Argus. 24 September 1925.
•*"» A Reuter message, dated 26 September, Natal Mercury. 28
September 1925.
** Cape Argus. 1 October 1925.
s l
 See Daily Record and Mail. 22 September 1925, for a
gloomy assessment of the economic situation in South Africa.
M
 Natal Mercury. 1 October 1925.
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select the next voyage. Those whose ships had departed would be
repatriated and would also get clean discharges."3 The terms were
communicated to the AMHU, who recommended acceptance, and on the
12th called off the strike in Britain.•»
The London strike committee held out -for another week before
conceding defeat, but the strike continued in Australia, and was
only declared over in South Africa on 24 October. In November
many seamen were still out in Durban,ma but ships sailed regular—
ly, stranded passengers had gone, produce and other goods were
moved. In December, some 500-600 destitute seamen were shipped
home by the South African government."*
The Impact on South Africa
The strike was not of South African origin, and the major
impact must be sought in Britain. Nonetheless, for two months
there had been strikers in the main ports, and thousands of local
citizens were involved. They were obviously affected, but in the
absence of records of their reactions, during or. after the event,
the historian is left with surmises rather than hard fact.
Ultimately the strike failed, and failures lead to a loss of
morale. Consequently, there was no rise in spirits in the CPSA,
and Biurski, who had invested so much energy in the strike, was
destitute, and unemployed. But the problem was not that of an
individual: there had been little political education during the
47 days, and despite the show of solidarity in this rare case of
an international strike, the CPSA gained little.
The white unions gained little (if anything) despite their
support for the seamen - and even this was blemished by the
threat of fund withdrawal in Cape Town. The SALP showed from the
beginning of the strike that it was split. It had been in the
government for barely a year when confronted by the seamen *s
action, and the division in their ranks was a warning of events
to come. In 1928 the party was torn apart: Creswell remained a
supporter of the pact government, and Madely led a minority who
"
3
 Cape Argus. 12 October 1925; International Transport
Workers Federation, Press Report• No 22. 24 October 1925 (which
stated the number of votes against as 240)
•• Daily Record and Mail. 13 October 1925.
•° International Transport Workers Federation Press Report.
Nos.22 and 23, 24 October and 7 November 1925. —-=--"=«=i-».
•» Workers Weekly (London), 4 December 1925.
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broke ranks. The differences in 1925 undoubtedly contributed to
the dissension inside the party but to what degree is unknown."'
The Labour Party stalwarts who played a part in the events in
Natal, particularly Dr Minnie Alper,TC who conveyed messages of
solidarity, and provided money and provisions, continued for many
years as a worker for the SALP. But Kemp and Simons did not make
the headlines again, and their further activities are not known.
The Indian community was relieved of the fear that lascars
might arrive and make their position more uncomfortable. They
continued their agitation for a Round Table conference, and it
was convened in 1927. Its outcome was not affected by the strike.
What might have become obvious to more radical elements in the
community, was the timerousness of the leadership, if indeed they
needed further evidence.
The greatest impact of the strike was on the country's economy
and whatever the tendencies in economic planning at the time, the
event must have helped concentrate minds sharply on the physical
isolation of the country. This had been obvious during the first
world war, and was now brought home again. In the absence of a
local fleet, the need to develop manufacture must have been
obvious. The historian can only guess at the impetus this lent to
plans to build up the steel and other indutries: a more important
factor than those usually advanced, involving attempts to secure
employment for "poor whites'. It is not necessary to propose that
the strike was the over—riding factor, to see that it must have
played a part in speeding government intervention in the develop-
ment of local industry, but it will remain a guess until we learn
more of the strike's effect on local thinking.
The group that had most to lose from a seamen's strike, were
the farmers, who were dependent on British mariners for the
export of their produce, and despite all the rhetoric of breaking
imperial ties, the farmers would stay beholden to the Empire -
until alternate markets were discovered, or new methods of
transport became available.
*"• Articles on the strike appeared in Forward. written by
Kentridge, and putting the case for higher wages. There seems
to have been no reply from the Cresswell 'camp'.
o =
 The Alper family had a record of radical activity,
starting in Pretoria, when some members were involved in the
activities of the International Socialist League, and then in
Durban, where they were known as supporters of radical causes.
The Natal Advertiser. 21 September 1925, condemned Minnie Alper
as an ' unabashed Commun i st' in an editorial, and also printed a
letter in which she was accused of being one of the fomenters of
the strike.
